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THE NEW FUEL FRONTIER: BIOMASS CONTRACTING*
L. PAUL GOERINGER**, DR. H.L. GOODWINm*, AND
DR. MICHAEL POPP
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 2006 State of the Union address, former President George W.
Bush announced a plan to fund research into the production of ethanol from
sources other than corn, including switchgrass, wood chips, and stalks from
food crops.' Most ethanol is derived from corn, but corn alone cannot
supply enough ethanol to fully meet the United States' energy needs.2 New
techniques are able to produce ethanol from plant cellulose, which is found
in the cellular walls of all forms of plant life. There are many sources of
suitable cellulose for ethanol production collectively called "biomass.'A
At the time of the speech, there was no commercial-scale
production of cellulosic ethanol taking place in the United States. To meet
the President's challenge, Congress passed the Energy Independence
Security Act of 2007 (EISA), which set annual targets for the domestic
production of cellulosic ethanol, increasing from one billion gallons in 2013
to sixteen billion gallons in 2022.6 EISA provides grants and other financial
. The authors would like to thank Jodi Endres of the University of Illinois, Dr. Ira Altman of
the Southern Illinois University, Timothy Slating, Dr. Francis Epplin of Oklahoma State University,
Brooke Schumm, and Phil Kunkel for answering various questions on contracting issues, cellulosic
ethanol production, and bankruptcy issues. The views in this article reflect only the views of the authors
and are not those of the University of Arkansas, the Department of Agricultural Economics and
Agribusiness, the University of Maryland, the Center for Agricultural and Natural Resource Policy, or
the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
. Mr. Goeringer is a research associate with the Center for Agricultural and Natural
Resources Policy in the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics at the University of
Maryland, College Park. This article was developed during his time as a graduate assistant for Dr. H.L.
Goodwin at the University of Arkansas's Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness.
.. Dr. Goodwin is a Professor of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness with the
University of Arkansas's Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness.
* ..Dr. Michael Popp is a Professor of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness with the
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' George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 31, 2006), available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/3 1/AR2006013101468.html.
2 Vincent Barbera, Comment, Tomorrow Today? Cellulosic Ethanol: How It 's Done, Who's
Getting it Done, and Its Environmental Impact, 20 VILL. ENvTL. L.J. 27, 29 (2009).
3 Id. at 30.
'Id. at 31.
6 42 U.S.C.A. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(11I) (West 2012). But cf Tom Doggett & Ayesha Rascoe,
EPA Proposes 2012 Ethanol Use at 13.2 Billion Gallons, REUTERS (June 21, 2011, 3:13 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/21/us-usa-ethanol-epa-idUSTRE75K5W-V20110621 (indicating
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assistance through the Department of Energy (DOE) to help develop the
technology necessary to begin commercial production of cellulosic
ethanol.7 Apart from EISA, DOE has invested almost $904 million to build
cellulosic ethanol biorefineries.
In addition to the EISA and the DOE, the United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) offers incentives for farmers to switch from
traditional crops to dedicated energy crops such as switchgrass, or to collect
crop residue that can be used to produce cellulosic ethanol.9 The 2008 Farm
Bill introduced the Biomass Crop Assistance Program (BCAP). 1o The
BCAP was designed to provide a financial incentive for farmers to grow
energy crops in specific project areas while the market for those crops was
established." As of late 2011, nine approved project areas existed in the
United States, spanning 173 counties in Arkansas, California, Kansas,
Missouri, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and
Washington.12 The BCAP was initially authorized only through 2012.13 14
Cellulosic ethanol provides a new opportunity for farmers because
it can be produced from a wide variety of plants and crop residues,
including biomass usually considered agricultural waste. Some examples
are wheat straw, rice straw, and corn stover.' 5 A farmer could generate
additional revenue by selling crop residue to a cellulosic ethanol producer.
The timber industry could also generate additional revenue by selling wood
chips and other lumber residues to cellulosic ethanol producers. 16
Additionally, cellulosic ethanol can be produced from a dedicated energy
crop. 17 Switchgrass, reed canary grass, and alfalfa are examples of
that the EPA recently proposed cutting the 2012 target for cellulosic ethanol production from 500
million gallons to between 3.45 million and 12.9 million gallons of cellulosic ethanol).
Barbera, supra note 5, at 34.
8 See id. at 42.
See Megan Stubbs, Cong. Research Serv., RL 41296, Biomass Crop Assistance Program
(BCAP): Status and Issues, 13-14 (2011), available at
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/R41296.pdf.
'o1d. at 1.
John N. Moore & Kale Van Bruggen, Agriculture's Fate Under Climate Change:
Economic and Environmental Imperatives for Action, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 87, 97 (2011); see also 7
U.S.C.A. § 8111(a)(2) (West 2012) (indicating a "project area" is a specific area designated by a
bioenergy sponsor; the sponsor has contracts for biomass production in the area, and is within a practical
distance from the production facility).
12 See USDA Biomass Crop Assistance (BCAP) Program Deadline Approaching, BEGINNING
FARMERS (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.beginningfarmers.org/usda-biomass-crop-assistance-bcap-
program-deadline-approaches/.
13 See Jim Monke, Cong. Research Serv., RL 41433, Expiring Farm Bill Programs Without a
Budget Baseline, 7 (2012), available at http://nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/R41433.pdf.
1" See Biomass Research & Dev. Bd., The Ecomonics of Biomass Feedstocks in the United
States: A Review of Literature, Occasional Paper No. 1, at 16 (2008), available at
http://www.usbiomassboard.gov/pdfs/feedstocksliterature review.pdf.
6 See id. at 24.
"Id. at 41.
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herbaceous energy crops. 18 Woody crops including willow, poplar,
cottonwood, sycamore, and southern pine, could also be grown as dedicated
energy crops.19
Switchgrass production in Arkansas has been the subject of
research at the University of Arkansas. One study by Dr. Michael P. Popp
calculated the cost of establishing switchgrass in Arkansas. The study
calculated the break-even prices for Arkansas farmers and ethanol
producers, and looked at advantages and disadvantages of switching from
conventional crops to switchgrass. 2 0 Dr. Popp and his colleagues also
analyzed alternatives to traditional row crops in Arkansas' Delta region,
where the current levels of irrigation are unsustainable. 21 This study found
that the production of dedicated energy crops could increase returns and
reduce farmers' losses if the use of the aquifers was restricted in the
future.22
A farmer is faced with a new set of legal problems when deciding
to supply a cellulosic ethanol producer with his crop residue, or when
changing to a dedicated energy crop. Furthermore a cellulosic ethanol
refinery requires a large capital investment to build, and the ethanol
producer will need to guarantee access to a reliable supply of biomass.23
The ethanol producer is likely to desire long-term contracts with farmers to
guarantee the supply of biomass.
This article will discuss considerations in drafting a biomass
production contract for farmers or cellulosic ethanol producers. Section
II(A)(1) will discuss basic contract law principles in the context of the
biomass industry. Section II(A)(2) will provide an overview of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) provisions which may apply to biomass. Section
II(B) will analyze terms which would typically be included in a biomass
production contract. Section II(C) will explain the consequences of possible
financial distress or bankruptcy of the cellulosic ethanol producer. Although
not exhaustive, this article will provide an overview of the common risks
and issues that could arise in contracting for the sale of biomass.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 54.
20 Michael P. Popp, Assessment of Alternative Fuel Production from Switchgrass: An
Example from Arkansas, 39 J. AGRIC. & APPLIED ECON. 373, 374 (2007), available at
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/6523/2/39020373.pdf.
21 See Michael Popp, Lanier Nalley & Gina Vickery, Irrigation Restriction and Biomass
Market Interactions: The Case of the Alluvial Aquifer, 42 J. AGRIC. & APPLIED EcoN. 69, 69 (2010).
22 Id. at 84.
23 See., e.g., David Shaffer, Poet Breaks Ground on Cellulosic Ethanol plant in Iowa,
STARTRIBUNE (Mar. 13, 2012, 7:26 PM), http://www.startribune.com/business/142515155.html?refer-y
(indicating that as recently as March 2012, the cost of building a cellulosic ethanol refinery in Iowa was
projected at $250,000,000).
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Contract Law
Contracting for biomass production is a developing area of law.
Farmers have experience dealing with crop and livestock production
contracts, but a biomass production contract presents contracting parties
with unresolved legal issues, principally in the application of the UCC and
common law. This article will examine a biomass production contract from
the perspective of Farmer B, a hypothetical farmer, and Ethanol A, a
hypothetical cellulosic ethanol producer. Both of the hypothetical parties
are located in Arkansas, in one of the BCAP project areas.24
1. Basic Contract Law Principles
The biomass industry in the United States is in its infancy.
Typically, a farmer will be presented with a written biomass production
contract by the cellulosic ethanol plant. This is not just wise in order to
provide a record of the parties' agreement, but will also be legally required.
With a large investment at stake in a cellulosic ethanol plant, the ethanol
producer will want multi-year commitments from farmers to ensure a
sufficient supply of biomass to operate the facility.25 Accordingly typical
contracts will require deliveries of biomass over the course of many years
and the statute of frauds, which requires all contracts that cannot be
performed within one year to be in writing and signed by both parties, will
apply. 26
Farmers should always read and understand their contract before
27signing. As is normally the case, the parties' legal rights are determined
by the contract, and both parties need to fully understand the contract to
understand what is expected of them over its duration.28 If our hypothetical
Farmer B finds the contract language unclear, he would be prudent to
consult with an attorney. 29 Hiring an attorney should not be seen as an
expense, but instead as an investment to avoid larger costs in the future.30
24 See USDA Biomass Crop Assistance (BCAP) Program Deadline Approaching, supra note
12.
25 See James A. Larson et al., Risk and Return for Bioenergy Crops Under Alternative
Contracting Agreements 1 (2008), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/
bitstream/6842/2/sp08la02.pdf.
26 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-101(6) (West 2011) (citing Arkansas law because the paper's
hypothetical farmer is in that state).
27 See Neil D. Hamilton, Why Own the Farm If You Can Own the Farmer (and the Crop)?:
Contract Production and Intellectual Property Protection of Grain Crops, 73 NEB. L. REV. 48, 66
(1994), available at http://nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/bibarticles/hamilton own.pdf.
28 See id.
29 See id
o See id
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The party who drafted the contract will often have an advantage over the
non-drafting party. Therefore, a farmer who signs a contract drafted by the
ethanol producer may be at a disadvantage. After all, "[r]emember the first
rule of contracts-the parties who write the contracts take care of
themselves." 3 1 Although it should be noted, that courts have been willing
to construe doubtful language in a contract against the drafting party, but a
farmer would not want to count on language being doubtful and discuss
unclear terms with an attorney.32
Farmer B's attorney should always explain the importance of
having a final contract that reflects all discussions between the parties.
Generally, in the "absence of fraud, accident or mistake, a written contract
merges, and thereby extinguishes, all prior and contemporaneous
negotiations, understandings and verbal agreements on the same subject."33
Farmer B should be careful to ensure that everything he and Ethanol A
agree upon is written down and included, because anything not in the
written contract will not be legally binding. In addition, any oral
agreements should be incorporated into the contract or included in a
separate writing signed by both parties.35
Because of the investment required to start a cellulosic ethanol
plant and the constant supply of biomass needed, ethanol producers are
likely to use long-term written contracts to ensure their supply. It should be
noted, however, that the ethanol plant may still need to buy additional
biomass to meet its demand. When the ethanol producer buys more than
$500 of biomass, Arkansas law will require a written contract "sufficient to
indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and
signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought." 3 6
The law takes a broad view of what will qualify as a written
contract. The contract can be traditional in the sense that it is written by one
of the parties and signed by both, but courts have also found a letter or
series of letters to be a contract.3 7 "A receipt or release, an order blank or
31 d. at 67.
32 See 17A AM. JUR.2D Contracts § 343 (2011).
33 Farmers Coop Ass'n v. Garrison, 454 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Ark. 1970).
34 id.
3 See Hamilton, supra note 27, at 67. See generally NEIL D. HAMILTON, FARMER'S LEGAL
GUIDE TO PRODUCTION CONTRACTS 12-19 (1995) [hereinafter FARMER'S LEGAL GUIDE], available at
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/articles/hamilton_productioncontracts.pdf (providing
additional suggestions on issues an agricultural producer should consider when looking at a production
contract); Joseph A. Miller, Contracting in Agriculture: Potential Problems, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 57,
88-89 (2003), available at http://nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/bibarticles/millercontracting.pdf
(presenting a list of the basic rules of agricultural contracting).
36 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-2-201(1) (West 2012).
37 See 10 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 29:29 (4th ed. 2012).
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invoice or statement of account, a draft or note, or a check" can also satisfy
the requirement. 8
One exception to the need for a sufficient written contract is when
the goods have been received and accepted by the buyer. 39 For example,
Farmer B has orally agreed to sell ten tons of wheat straw to Ethanol A.
Ethanol A picks up the straw from the farmer. Two months later, Ethanol A
has failed to pay for the straw, and Farmer B wishes to bring a legal action
to get paid. Farmer B would not need to show a written contract because the
biomass has been received and accepted by Ethanol A.40
Farmer B's attorney should also explain to him the concept of
"accord and satisfaction," which may affect his legal rights if he accepts
partial payment. When two parties have a dispute over the amount
allegedly owed under a contract, the parties may create a new contract for
discharge of the amount owed.42 When a good faith dispute exists, a new
contract is created when a party accepts payment of less than the contract
amount.43 During a dispute over the amount owed, farmers who cash or
deposit a check clearly marked "full payment" but that is for an amount less
than the disputed sum, may forfeit the disputed difference." But marking a
check for an amount less than the debt with "full payment" does not
actually create a new contract unless there is a good faith dispute over the
amount owed.45
For example, Farmer B has signed a long-term contract to provide
100 tons of a specified quality of rice straw to Ethanol A each year. One
year, Ethanol A determines that Farmer B's rice straw is below the quality
specified in the contract, but still acceptable for cellulosic ethanol
production. Ethanol A contacts Farmer B to tell him the rice straw is of
lower quality, and that they will not pay the full contract price. Farmer B
demands the contract price for the rice straw, but Ethanol A insists he will
only pay the reduced rate because the straw is below quality. After
negotiating fails to resolve the dispute, Ethanol A sends Farmer B a check
for the lower rate marked "final payment for 2013's rice straw," and Farmer
B deposits this check. This is an example of accord and satisfaction because
" See id
3 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-2-201(3)(c) (West 2012).
" See generally Tenn. Valley Cotton Oil Mill v. Oakland Gin Co., 341 So.2d 153, 155 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1976) (finding that agricultural crops fall under this exception); O'Day v. George Arakelian
Farms, Inc., 540 P.2d 197, 200-01 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); Seminole Peanut Co. v. Goodson, 335 S.E.2d
157, 159-160 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); In re Estate of Nelson, 311 N.W.2d 508, 509-10 (Neb. 1981); Wilke
v. Holdrege Coop. Equity Exch., 265 N.W.2d 672, 675 (Neb. 1978); Hofiann v. Stoller, 320 N.W.2d
786, 791 (N.D. 1982).
41 See Hamilton, supra note 27, at 77.
42 29 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 73:29 (4th ed. 2012).
43 See id
" See id.
4 See id
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the following requirements are met: there is a good faith dispute over the
amount owed, a payment of a lesser amount made to discharge that debt,
and acceptance of the payment by depositing the check. Farmers should be
informed that in this situation they should not give in to the temptation to
46deposit or cash the check before contacting an attorney.
2. The Uniform Commercial Code
The UCC provides a model law for commercial transactions,
including biomass production contracts. Article 2 of the UCC encompasses
the sale of goods and should be considered when drafting the biomass
production contract. 7 The UCC has yet to be applied to biomass production
contracting, but it is likely to govern biomass transactions.
Article 2 of the UCC applies to transactions involving the sale of
goods. The UCC has definition of goods includes "growing crops."49
States have found "growing crops" to include wheat,so corn,s' sunflowers,5 2
cotton,53 Soybeans, 54watermelons,s" and potatoes." A dedicated crop for
biomass production, like switchgrass, will likely be encompassed in the
definition of "growing crops" because of the similarities between the two.
Whether the "growing crops" designation also covers the crop
residue left over after harvesting a crop is an unresolved issue. The drafters
of the UCC state in the comments that "growing crops" should be given a
broad definition to include "modern practices." 5' Arguably, "modern
practices" include the use of crop residues to produce ethanol, thus crop
residue should fall under this definition. Ultimately, a court may have to
decide if crop residues are goods under Article 2 of the UCC.
The UCC also addresses issues that arise when one party provides
the other party with notice of intent not to perform the contract." For
46 The reader should note that the lesser amount would satisfy the current disputed contract,
but not future contracts. If the farmer and the ethanol producer negotiate another biomass production
contract, then it is considered a separate legal transaction. Payments made under the new contract would
not apply to the disputed amount. See I Am. Jur.2d Accord and Satisfaction § 49 (2011).
4 See FARMER's LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 35, at 20.
48 See U.C.C. § 2-102 (2003).
49 See U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2003).
so See Balfour, Guthrie & Co., Ltd v. Gourmet Farms, 166 Cal. Rprt. 422, 426 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980).
" See Countrymark Coop, Inc. v. Smith, 705 N.E.2d 738 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
52 See Red River Commodities, Inc. v. Eidsness, 459 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1990).
53 See Harris v. Hine, 205 S.E.2d 847 (Ga. 1974).
54 See Cargill v. Hale, 537 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
5 Zolman v. SEMO Produce, Inc. 875 S.W.2d 605 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
56See H.C. Schmieding Produce Co. v. Cagle, 529 So.2d 243 (Ala. 1988); Lickley v. Max
Herbold, Inc., 984 P.2d 697 (Idaho 1999); G & H Land & Cattle Co. v. Heltzman & Nelson, Inc., 628
P.2d 1038 (Idaho 1981); Borges v. Magic Valley Foods, Inc., 616 P.2d 273 (Idahol980).
1 See U.C.C § 2-105 cmt. 1 (2003).
s See U.C.C. § 2-610 (2003).
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example, Ethanol A gives notice to Farmer B that Ethanol A will refuse
biomass deliveries from Farmer B. The issue is the amount of damages that
should be paid to Farmer B. In this example, Farmer B would need to show
that the breach "substantially impairs" the value of the whole contract in
order to receive damages.
The Arkansas Court of Appeals recently analyzed when an
agricultural contract is "substantially impaired." In Cargill, Inc. v. Storms
Agri Enterprises, Inc., a dairy entered into a contract to purchase seventeen
truckloads of cottonseed from Cargill.59 After the first three deliveries, the
dairy received a better price for cottonseed from a third party and canceled
delivery of the fourth truckload from Cargill.o Cargill then sent a letter to
the dairy stating that they considered this a breach of the contract and
demanded payment of the difference between the contract price and the
current market price.6' An Arkansas Court of Appeals found "substantially
impair" to require "the fact finder to look at the materiality of a party's
repudiation as it relates to the entire contract." 62 Looking at the facts, the
court found repudiation of fourteen out of seventeen loads of cottonseed
substantially impaired the whole contract.6 3
A court will have to decide whether repudiation "substantially
impairs" a biomass-production contract and Cargill may provide guidance
in analogous cases. For example, Ethanol A and Farmer B have a biomass
production contract spanning a ten-year period. In year two of the contract,
Ethanol A discovers that Farmer C is willing to supply biomass at a much
lower price than Farmer B. Ethanol A tells Farmer B they will not accept
any further shipments of biomass. Farmer B has only made two shipments
and under the contract would make eight more. As in Cargill, there was
repudiation early in the life of the contract with a majority of deliveries still
outstanding. According to Cargill, this may substantially impair the
contract.
A court could also consider the fact that Farmer B might have no
other available markets for biomass if Ethanol A repudiates the biomass
production contract. Biomass has fewer available markets compared to a
traditional row crop, which is compelling evidence that the repudiation has
"substantially impaired" the biomass production contract. A court would
have to decide if availability of fewer alternative markets is sufficient proof
the biomass contract was substantially impaired.
Once it is determined that the contract has been breached, damages
awarded will obviously depend on whether the farmer or the ethanol
producer is the breaching party. If the ethanol producer breaches the
5 Cargill, Inc. v. Storms Agri Enter., 878 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ark. Ct. App. 1994).
6 Id.
61 Id.
6
1 Id. at 789.
63 Id. at 790.
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contract, then the farmer will have several remedies available.6 The farmer
can cancel the biomass production contract. 6 5 The farmer can withhold
delivery of the biomass, including stopping any employee or third-party
holding the biomass from delivering to the ethanol producer. 66 The farmer
can also sell the biomass for another purpose and then sue the ethanol
producer for any loss of income.67
For example, Farmer B and Ethanol A contract for five tons of
biomass at $100/ton, and Ethanol A breaches the contract before the last
delivery. Farmer B then sells the biomass to Farmer D as a feedstock at
only $80/ton. Farmer B has lost $20/ton from Ethanol A's breach that he
can recover. Farmer B may also get incidental damages for "any
commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions incurred in
stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and custody of goods after the
[ethanol producer's] breach, in connection with return or resale of the goods
or otherwise resulting from the breach."68
If the farmer is the breaching party, the ethanol producer will also
have several available remedies. The ethanol producer can cancel the
biomass production contract and recover any part of the price paid to the
farmer.6 9 The ethanol producer can also seek monetary damages.70 There
are two methods of calculating the producer's monetary damages. One
calculation is the difference between the price of replacement goods and the
72contract price. The other is the difference between current market price
73and the contract price.
The ethanol producer may also be able to recover incidental or
consequential damages.74 Incidental damages for the recipient of the goods
under a breached contract include "expenses reasonably incurred in
inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully
rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in
connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident
to the delay or other breach." 75 Consequential damages are "[any] loss
resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the
" U.C.C. § 2-703 (2003).
6 U.C.C. § 2-703(f) (2003).
6 U.C.C. § 2-703(a)-(b) (2003).
67 U.C.C. § 2-706 (2003).
68 U.C.C. § 2-710 (2003).
69 U.C.C. § 2-711(1) (2003).
'o U.C.C. § 2-712 (2003).
7 Dickson v. Delhi Seed Co., 760 S.W.2d 382, 388-89 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988).
72 Id.; see also Bradford Stone, Uniform Commercial Code In a Nutshell, 133-34 (West 8th
Ed. 2012) (comparing cover to the seller's right to the difference between contract price and resale
price).
" U.C.C. § 2-713 (2003); see also Stone, supra note 72, at 134-35 (comparing the buyer's
remedy to the seller's right to the difference between contract price and market price).
74 Delhi Seed Co., 760 S.W.2d at 389.
7 U.C.C. § 2-715(1) (2003).
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seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not
reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise.", 6
The UCC treats the sale of goods differently if the seller is a
"merchant." A "merchant" is defined by the UCC as:
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the
transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be
attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other
intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as
having such knowledge or skill.7
States are divided on whether farmers are merchants under this definition.
In Arkansas, where our hypothetical Farmer B is located, the Arkansas
Supreme Court has held that farmers are not considered merchants under
the UCC.78 In Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, Cook Grains believed that it had
entered into a contract with a farmer for the delivery of 5,000 bushels of
soybeans.79 The grain company's agent signed a contract and mailed it to
the farmer, but the farmer never signed it.80 The farmer never delivered the
soybeans.8 ' The court found that insufficient evidence was presented to
show the farmer was "a dealer in goods of the kind [soybeans] or by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or a skill peculiar to the
practices of goods involved in the transaction, and no such knowledge or
skill can be attributed to him." 82 The court turned to traditional definitions
of a "farmer," and found a farmer is "one devoted to the tillage of the soil,
such as an agriculturalist ... [and] a man who cultivates a considerable tract
of land in some one of the usual recognized ways of farming."" According
to the court, the UCC's definition of a merchant should not be applied to
farmers when they are selling the commodities that they grow. 8 4 This
decision dates from 1965, just four years after the passage of the UCC in
Arkansas. 5 At that time, the court found no other state "holding that the
word farmer may be construed to mean merchant." 86 Since 1965, a number
6 U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (2003).
" U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2003).
78 Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 395 S.W.2d 555, 556-57 (Ark. 1965).
"Id. at 555.
oId. at 556.
81 Id
82 id
83 Cook Grains, Inc., 395 S.W.2d at 556
8 Id. at 557.
s See U.C.C. § 1-101 (2003).
86 Cook Grains, Inc., 395 S.W.2d at 556-57.
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of states have found farmers to be merchants, while other states like
Arkansas have held that they are not.87
States which have found farmers to be merchants did so with the
view that modem agriculture is "far more than simply planting and
harvesting crops ... [today's] farmers possess an extensive knowledge and
sophistication regarding the purchase and sale of crops on the various
agricultural markets." 8 Courts have looked at the length of time the farmer
has been engaged in selling the particular commodity, the degree of the
farmer's business understanding, the farmer's knowledge of agricultural
markets, and the farmer's experience with the customs and practices of
selling the commodity.89 A farmer with a long history of marketing and
contracting his crop would be more likely to be classified as a merchant. On
the other hand, a farmer who has another profession and only farms as a
hobby, with limited and only casual understandings of agricultural markets,
may not meet the UCC's definition of merchant.
When courts find a farmer to be a merchant under the UCC.
Farmers in that state would gain the UCC's protections for merchants.90
Farmers would also have to deal with the protections that the UCC provides
buyers, including implied warranties.9'
The UCC contains multiple implied warranties, which should be
considered when drafting a contract for biomass production.92 The first is
the implied warranty of merchantability. Because the biomass is being sold
for cellulosic ethanol production, the UCC will imply a warranty that it is
"fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." 93 Because the
cellulosic ethanol industry is so new, ethanol producers may have trouble
enforcing this warranty in court. Furthermore, the implied warranty of
merchantability requires that the seller be a merchant in the kind of goods
being sold.94 As previously discussed, farmers are not considered merchants
in all jurisdictions. Even in jurisdictions where farmers are considered
merchants of their primary crop, farmers may not be merchants of crop
residue. In Fred J. Moore v. Schinmann, a farmer who grew mint and
usually sold his crop in the form of mint oil was considered a merchant of
mint oil, but not a merchant of mint roots. When the farmer made a single
sale of mint roots, that sale was not accompanied by an implied warranty of
8 See David B. Harrison, Annotation, Farmers as "Merchants" Within Provisions of UCC
Articles 2, Dealing With Sales, 95 A.L.R.3d 484 (1979).
88 Colorado-Kansas Grain Co. v. Reifschneider, 817 P.2d 637, 640 (Colo. App. 1991).
" E.g., id. at 640.
9 See Hamilton, supra note 27, at 77.
91 See id.at 76-84.
9 See U.C.C. §§ 2-313 to -315 (2003).
9 U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (2003).
94 U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (2003).
9 Fred J. Moore Inc. v. Schinmann, 700 P.2d 754, 757 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
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merchantability. 96 A similar distinction could be made between crops and
crop residue.
The UCC provides an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose when "the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods."97 Farmers contracting with cellulosic ethanol producers will usually
know the particular purpose for which the goods are required. This
warranty is implied even when the seller is not a merchant. However, the
buyer must rely on the seller's skill or judgment in some way.99 Often, the
cellulosic ethanol producer will know more than the farmer about what
biomass is suitable for the ethanol production process, which may require a
certain quality of biomass in order to operate. 00 When the buyer has
superior knowledge about his purpose, this warranty will not apply.
However, farmers entering the market should be cautious about marketing
biomass for ethanol production unless they know it is fit for the purpose.
Although these legal questions are interesting, they can be avoided.
The farmer can waive the implied warranties by including language such as
"as is," "with all faults," or other language which calls the buyer's attention
to the exclusion of warranties and communicates that there is no implied
warranty.'0o The cellulosic ethanol producer should avoid trying to enforce
an implied warranty by including a precise description of what he is
bargaining for in the contract. 102
This discussion of contract and commercial law is intended only an
overview. There are other issues that may arise that have not been covered
here. As mentioned previously, an inexperienced farmer should hire an
attorney to ensure that all potential issues are addressed.
B. Common Biomass Contract Terms
Currently, the cellulosic ethanol industry is in its infancy and there
is no model biomass production contract.10 3 The industry has not had the
time or experience to develop a standard production contract like the
vegetable and poultry industries employ. Nevertheless, some terms will be
96 Id.
9 U.C.C § 2-315 (2003).
9 Id.
99 Id
'" See Ira J. Altman, Dwight R. Sanders, & Chris R. Boessen, Applying Transaction Cost
Economics: A Note on Biomass Supply Chains, 25 J. OF AGRIBUSINESS 107, 112 (2007) [hereinafter
Applying Transaction Cost Economics].
U.C.C § 2-316(2) (2003).
102 See U.C.C. § 2-313 (2003).
103 See Zachary R. F. Schreiner, Comment, Frankenfuel: Genetically Modifed Corn, Ethanol,
and Crop Diversity, 30 ENERGY L. J. 169, 170 (2009).
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shared between all biomass production contracts. The drafter of a biomass
production contract should consider including: (1) the price to be paid to the
farmer; (2) the quantity supplied; (3) the acceptable quality of biomass; (4)
the storage of the biomass; (5) the cellulosic ethanol producer access to
information about the biomass; (6) provisions binding future operators of
the farm; (7) provisions requiring the use of arbitration; (8) an excuse in
performance clause; and (9) a restoration clause.
1. Price Clause
All biomass production contracts will generally involve a price.
This clause is one way for both the ethanol producer and the farmer to
protect against the risks associated with changing prices.104 With the high
startup costs of the production facility, ethanol producers seek ways to
reduce the costs of obtaining a sufficient supply of biomass. 05 Meanwhile
the farmer faces uncertainties in price and market for his biomass.
Contracting for a fixed price is one way both parties can reduce these risks.
For a short-term contract, the farmer could be offered a flat rate per
pound or per ton of biomass supplied.'06 One solution to avoid a long-term,
fixed-price contract is that the payment term could be tied to a relevant
commodity price such as the price of oil. One contract states a price clause
as follows: "[prices] range between $5/ton when oil is below 20/[barrel],
$8/ton when the price of oil is between $30-$35/[barrel], and $15/ton when
the price of oil is over $65/[barrel]."o? These two payment methods can be
combined. A portion could be priced at a fixed rate per pound or per ton
and the other portion would be tied to the price of oil. 08 The price clause
can take any form or any variation agreed upon by the ethanol producer and
the farmer, so either party is free to come up with a creative way to protect
himself from price volatility.
2. Quantity Clause
The amount of biomass to be supplied should be a term included in
biomass production contracts. As discussed earlier, cellulosic ethanol plants
1o4 See Christopher R. Kelley, Agricultural Production Contracts: Drafting Considerations,
18 HAMLINE L. REv. 397, 403 (1995), available at http://nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/
bibarticles/kelley agricultural.pdf.
1os See Larson et al., supra note 25, at 1.
16 See Williamette Biomass Processors, Inc.-Camelina Production Contract for 2008 (2008),
available at http://www.willamettebiomass.com/files/WBPCamelinaContract3.pdf (providing an
example of a contract using flat rate pricing for a dedicated energy crop, camelina).
' 7Ira J. Altman, Chris Boessen, & Dwight R. Sanders, Contracting for Biomass: Supply
Chain Strategies for Renewable Energy, 71 J. ASFMRA 1, 12 (2008) [hereinafter Contracting for
Biomass], available at http://portal.asfnra.org/userfiles/file/journal/281_altmanI.pdf.
'os See id. at 13.
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require a sufficient supply of biomass to keep the plant operating at
capacity.109 One cellulosic ethanol plant requires "approximately 1,500 tons
per day of biomass material from 1,000 acres to produce approximately 45
million gallons of ethanol per year.""o Cellulosic ethanol producers will
want the contract to specify the amount of biomass to be delivered to ensure
an adequate supply for the year.
The quantity clause will benefit farmers by creating some financial
certainty. Farmers will gain a guaranteed demand for biomass each year and
a steady source of yearly income.1" This planned cash flow will give
farmers some stability and will enable them to open lines of credit.112
Knowing the quantity of biomass required will also affect the crop rotation
decisions farmers make. The contract will require farmers to plant enough
acreage of a specific crop to meet the contracted quantity. This will limit
planting decisions if the farmer is using a crop rotation system or limit the
ability to change to an alternative crop when crop prices fluctuate. The
farmer will want to consider the future impact on their other business
decisions before signing a long-term agreement.
3. Quality Clause
Depending on the conversion process used, biomass might need to
be a specific quality in order to be converted into cellulosic ethanol.11 3
When the cellulosic ethanol production process requires a certain biomass
quality, the production contract should specify that quality. For example,
the biomass production contract used by logen specifies the quality of straw
that would be acceptable on delivery.114 To be acceptable, the wheat or
barley straw quality must "be harvested, golden without rot or weathering,
maximum of 18% moisture content, segregated as the type of straw as
agreed, and free of any preventable toxins as identified by the processor in
advance of harvest.""' When quality is included in the contract, farmers
should use appropriate tests to make sure that the biomass delivered is up to
the quality levels required in the contract.
4. Storage Clause
As discussed earlier, a cellulosic ethanol plant requires a large
volume of biomass. One typical facility requires 547,500 tons of biomass
10 See Larson et al., supra note 25, at 1.
110 Contracting for Biomass, supra note 107, at 3.
11 See Hamilton, supra note 27, at 9.
"' See generally id.
113 See Applying Transaction Cost Economics, supra note 100, at 112.
114 Contracting for Biomass, supra note 107, at 13.
s Id.
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per year just to operate."' 6 It is difficult for one facility to have the storage
capacity to handle such a quantity of biomass at one time. For this reason,
the ethanol producer should consider including a storage term in the
biomass production contract, requiring the farmer to store biomass until the
producer needs it." 7 In some biomass production contracts, the ethanol
producer also requires the farmer to provide ready access so that the
cellulosic ethanol producer can pick up the stored biomass as needed."'
Cellulosic ethanol producers should consider adding in a storage
clause. Requiring the farmer to store the biomass until needed would keep
the ethanol producer from building costly storage facilities. However,
placing storage responsibilities with the farmer increases the farmer's costs.
The farmer may not have adequate storage space to store the biomass and
would need to rent additional land to store the biomass. If the quality of the
biomass is a concern, the farmer may also be forced to invest in equipment
to protect the biomass. Farmers should negotiate for increased rates to
compensate for these increased costs.
Another concern with the storage clause arises when obtaining
insurance to cover possible loss of the biomass. In Arkansas, where our
hypothetical parties are contracting, a party needs to have an "insurable
interest" in the property to purchase insurance.' 19 Arkansas courts have
defined an "insurable interest" to be some lawful or substantial economic
interest in the property, including when the parties have a contract right.120
The biomass production contract would give the cellulosic ethanol producer
a contract right in the biomass produced by the farmer. If the contract does
not address insurance, both parties can purchase insurance policies to cover
the risk of losses. However, it may be more economically efficient to assign
the responsibility of purchasing insurance to one party, negotiating a higher
or lower selling price depending on which party takes out the insurance on
the stored biomass.
5. Logistics Clause
The cellulosic ethanol producer should also consider a "planning
and logistics" clause.121 When this provision is included, the farmer grants
the cellulosic ethanol producer access to his land and agrees to provide the
ethanol producer with information as required. 122 The information may
include access to the farmer's Farm Service Agency reports, a biomass
"6 See id. at 3.
'" See id.
"1 See id.
"' ARK. CODE. ANN. § 23-79-104(a) (West 2012).
120 See Beatty v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 954 S.W.2d 250, 254 (Ark. 1997).
121 See Contracting for Biomass, supra note 107, at 13.
122 See id.
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production forecast by a certain date, and "notice of all changes to acres
farmed, crop rotation, or any other pertinent information for straw volume
or yields." 2 3
6. Transfer ofAgreement Clause
The remaining terms are common in contracts, but should not be
forgotten in the context of a biomass production contract. A transfer of
agreement clause would require the farmer to transfer the contract if he
transfers his farm. 124 With this clause, if the farmer decides to stop farming
during the life of the biomass production contract, he will make his best
effort to extend the biomass production contract to the successor in interest
in the farmland. 125 If the farmer were to die during the term of the contract,
this clause would bind the farmer's heirs to perform the contract. 12 6 This
clause assists the cellulosic ethanol producer in guaranteeing a stable supply
of biomass.
7. Alternative Dispute Resolution
Another common contract clause requires any contract disputes to
be settled by alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques. Arbitration
and mediation are the most common ADR techniques. 127 Arbitration is a
process of settling disputes outside of the court system by the use of a
neutral third party. 128 This process allows for negotiating of flexible
solutions, costs less, and provides quicker resolutions of disputes than the
court system, while remaining confidential and private. 129 Arbitration can
be binding or nonbinding depending on the language in the contract.130
Binding arbitration makes the decision of the third party is legally
enforceable.13 ' In non-binding arbitration, the decision of the third party is
not mandated on the two parties and no enforceable award is granted. 13 2
123 id.
124 See id at 15.
125 Id.
126 See FARMER'S LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 35, at 44.
127 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 86 (8th ed. 2004).
1
28 Id.at 86, 112.
129 See Arbitration 101: The Basics of Arbitration, NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM,
http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/arb%20101-21 .pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).
130 Alternative Dispute Resolution, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION - JON GRIFFIN,
http://jongriffin.com/business-articles/business-law/alternative-dispute-resolution/ (last visited Oct. 11,
2012).
',3 See Steven C. Bennett, Non-Binding Arbitration: An Introduction, 61-2 DISP. RESOL. J. 22
(2006), available at http-//www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/266ff349-03el-4610-a7cl-6cdOf95le8bb/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ld047cae-3d31-4b6b-b280-
7led96efa8e5/Bennett,%20Steven%5B2%5D.pdf
132 See id.
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The other common ADR method is mediation. Mediation is "[a]
method of nonbinding dispute resolution involving a neutral third party who
tries to help the disputing parties reach a mutually agreeable solution."
Mediation, like arbitration, allows for flexible outcomes, lower costs, and
quicker resolutions compared to the court system, and it can also be
confidential. 134 The biomass production contract may contain a clause
requiring disputes arising under the contract to be resolved using ADR.
8. Excuse in Performance Clause
The parties may also include an "excuse in performance" clause,
also known as a "force majeure" or "act of God" clause. The excuse in
performance clause covers situations where a flood, drought, or some other
action out of a party's control prevents one party from performing. 135
Performance will typically be excused for causes like "a government act,
such as a grain embargo, a strike by truck drivers, or a natural event, such
as flood or drought." 136 Arkansas courts have rarely dealt with the
application of a force majeure clause in the agricultural contracts context.
Recently, an Arkansas Court of Appeals found that flooding on the
Mississippi River preventing a rice merchant from picking up a farmer's
rice during the contractual delivery period fell under the force majeure
clause.137
9. Restoration Bonds Clause
A farmer who decides to switch production to a dedicated energy
crop, such as switchgrass or miscanthus, may consider including a clause
for restoration bonds to lower the risk that the cellulosic ethanol plant will
prematurely close or enter bankruptcy. The restoration bond provision
designates a certain amount of money at the start of the contract to be used
to restore the farmer's land to the previous use should the farmer wish to
return to conventional crops. This fixed sum would be reduced by specified
amounts over the life of the biomass production contract. It covers costs
associated with removing the established dedicated energy crop and
returning the land to the previous crop production.
133 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (8th ed. 2004).
134See Mediation, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public education/resources/
lawrelated education network/howcourts work/mediation advantages.html (last visited Oct. 11,
2012).
135 See FARMER'S LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 35, at 28.
136 id,
137 See Cassinger v. Poinsett Cnty. Rice & Grain, Inc., No. CA 09-677, 2010 WL 1478773, at
*1-3 (2010 Ark. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2010).
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This clause may be worth special consideration because, as the next
section will discuss, the risk that a cellulosic ethanol plant will enter
bankruptcy is significant.
C. Bankruptcy Issues
While a production contract with a cellulosic ethanol plant may
provide our farmer with a new source of income and other benefits, the
contract also presents uncertainties. Because biomass production is a new
field, it is a real possibility that the cellulosic ethanol plant will fail and file
for bankruptcy. In 2008, sixteen ethanol plants filed for bankruptcy
protection, including VeraSun Energy, one of the largest ethanol producers
in the United States.' 38 Analysts have warned that the ethanol industry
could see more bankruptcy filings in the near future.139 The bankruptcies in
2008 were the result of high crop prices, and 2011 also saw a spike in crop
prices.140
Although cellulosic ethanol plants can lock in the price for biomass
through a biomass production contract, the cellulosic ethanol producer can
face pressure from rising commodity prices. As the price of other crops
increase, the cellulosic ethanol producer will be forced to pay a higher price
for dedicated energy crops to ensure the required level of biomass is
delivered. There are few, if any, risk management tools to protect cellulosic
ethanol producers from increasing biomass prices.
As a consequence of this risk, farmers will need to know how to
protect themselves in the event that the cellulosic ethanol producer files for
bankruptcy. Farmers should realize that nothing would provide complete
protection from the cellulosic ethanol producer's bankruptcy, but that the
law does provide some options. These protections focus on compensating
the farmer for biomass already delivered, not future deliveries. This section
will also discuss features of the Bankruptcy Code that a bankrupt ethanol
producer could use for his protection and possible defenses a farmer could
use against these protections.
138 See Dan Piller, Ethanol Plant Failures to Climb, Banker Predicts, DES MOINES REG., Nov.
18, 2008, at DI.
"' See Ethanol Plants at Risk of Another 'Shake-out', AGRIMONEY.COM (Feb. 23, 2011),
http://www.agrimoney.com/news.php?id=2857.
'4 See id.
88
THE NEW FUEL FRONTIER
1. Protections for Farmers
(a) UCC Protections
Prior to a bankruptcy filing, the UCC provides protection when one
party believes the other party may not be able to perform.14' The actual
performance, and not just the promise to perform, is essential to all
contracts.142 This provision of the UCC protects the farmer when he has
reasonable grounds to believe the cellulosic ethanol producer will not be
able to perform.143 The farmer can make a written demand to the cellulosic
ethanol producer for adequate assurances of his ability to perform his
contractual obligations. '" Until the cellulosic ethanol producer gives
adequate assurances, any deliveries by the farmer can be suspended.14 5 The
UCC gives the ethanol producer thirty days to respond to this demand.146
In order to utilize this section of the UCC, the farmer would need
reasonable grounds for insecurity in the ethanol producer's performance
and for the ethanol producer's failure to give adequate assurances of his
ability to perform. In determining whether reasonable grounds for
insecurity exist, the Arkansas Supreme Court has set forth the following
factors to consider:
(1) the nature of the sales contract; (2) the repetition by the
party upon whom demand is made of conduct that caused
insecurity in other transactions; (3) insecurity existing in
the performance of other contracts unrelated legally to the
contract at issue; (4) the expanding use of a credit term by
the party upon whom demand is made; and (5) reputation
and rumors concerning the stability and conduct of the
party upon whom demand is made.147
Another time to demand adequate assurance is when the buyer is delinquent
in paying the seller for goods delivered.' 4 8 If the ethanol producer falls
behind in paying the farmer for biomass delivered, the farmer would
generally have reasonable grounds for insecurity in the ethanol producer's
performance and could make a written demand for adequate assurances
141 U.C.C. § 2-609 (2003).
142 See 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales § 480 (2011).
143 U.C.C. § 2-609(1) (2003).
'" see id.
145 See id.
146 id
1 Ford Motor Co. v. Ellison, 974 S.W.2d 464,467 (Ark. 1998).
141 U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 3 (2003).
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from the ethanol producer.14 9 Other examples include a reasonable belief
that the cellulosic producer is insolvent, or that the cellulosic ethanol
producer has failed to perform some aspect of the contract.'50 The farmer
will be responsible for proving that he had reasonable grounds for
insecurity in the ethanol producer's performance.'
Next, the farmer will need to show that the ethanol producer failed
to give "adequate assurances" of his ability to perform. The farmer does not
get to dictate the form that the assurance will take, because the farmer could
ask for assurances that would not satisfy a reasonable person in the position
of the farmer.152 If the farmer is not considered a merchant, then adequate
assurances are only "the minimum kinds of promises or acts on the part of
the [ethanol producer] that would satisfy a reasonable man in the position of
the [farmer] that his expectation of receiving due performance will be
fulfilled."' If the farmer is a "merchant," the test will be whether the
ethanol producer made "the minimum kind of promises or acts . . . that
would satisfy a reasonable merchant in the position of the [farmer] that his
expectation of receiving due performance will be fulfilled." 54
The example given in the UCC for sufficient adequate assurance is
where "the buyer can make use of a defective delivery, a mere promise by a
seller of good repute that he is giving the matter his attention and that the
defect will not be repeated, is normally sufficient."' 5 However, the UCC
comments also explain that if a merchant is known to cut comers, then the
merchant's statement that he is giving the matter his attention could be
insufficient based on his reputation.156 The adequacy of the assurance is
judged in light of the situation between the farmer and the ethanol producer
and the reputation of the party giving the assurance using the reasonable
person or reasonable merchant standards.157
For example, Farmer B has made three deliveries on time to
Ethanol A, but Ethanol A has failed to pay Farmer B for any of the
deliveries. Before Farmer B makes the fourth delivery, he sends Ethanol A
a written letter demanding assurances that Ethanol A still plans to perform
the contract. Ethanol A responds by paying in full for the previous three
deliveries. By paying in full, Ethanol A has given an adequate assurance to
149 See generally, Matthew C. Brenneman, Annotation, Sales: What Constitutes "Reasonable
Grounds for Insecurity" Justifying Demand for Adequate Assurance of Performance Under UCC § 2-
609,37 A.L.R.5th 459 (1996).
50 See William D. Hawkland, Reasonable Grounds for Insecurity, 2 HAWKLAND UCC
SERIES § 2-609:2 (2012).
... See Ford Motor Co., 974 S.W.2d at 467.
152 See U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 3 (2003).
1s3 Id.
154 Id
"' U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 4 (2003).
Is See id.
11 See id. at cmt. 4 (providing additional examples of the adequacy of assurance).
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Farmer B, and Farmer B will not be able to claim the contract was
repudiated.
If no adequate assurances are given within thirty days of the written
demand, the contract is viewed as repudiated by the ethanol producer.'58 At
this point, the farmer will no longer be required to make any outstanding
deliveries of biomass.15 9 The farmer could then bring a claim against the
ethanol producer for damages resulting from the breach of contract, but the
farmer must show that the value of the contract as a whole was substantially
impaired by the ethanol producer's repudiation.16 0
The farmer would then want to consider alternative markets for his
biomass. If a biomass production contract is repudiated, then under the
UCC, the farmer will need to try to find a new market for the biomass. If
the farmer was selling crop residue, the farmer's alternative markets are
limited, because there is unlikely to be another ethanol plant in the area.
Some markets do exist for crop residue for uses other than cellulosic
ethanol production. For example, the farmer could still sell rice straw or
wheat straw as a forage crop.
The issue becomes more complicated when the farmer has switched
to a dedicated energy crop, such as switchgrass in Arkansas. The farmer
should consider the alternative markets for the dedicated energy crop before
switching completely from a traditional crop. For switchgrass, one
alternative market that exists is as a forage crop.' 6 ' Switchgrass can be used
as a hay crop or cattle can be allowed to graze switchgrass.162 One existing
market for forage sorghum is as silage. If the farmer is not already involved
in cattle production or near an area with an existing hay or silage market,
these alternative markets for switchgrass or forage sorghum may not be
available. The farmer should consider the possibility that the cellulosic
ethanol plant may close, and carefully consider the alternative markets that
exist for a dedicated energy crop before making any decision to switch
production.
(b) Bankruptcy Code Protections
The Bankruptcy Code offers protections for farmers dealing with
an ethanol producer in bankruptcy. Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy
Code allows the farmer, as a supplier of goods, to claim as an
administrative expense the value of any goods received by the cellulosic
1ss See id
1
59 See Thos. Cox & Sons Mach. Co. v. Forshee, 131 S.W. 454, 456 (Ark. 1910); see also
Kirchman v. Tuffli Bros. Pig Iron & Coke Co., 122 S.W. 239, 240-41 (Ark. 1909).
16 See Cargill, Inc. v. Storms Agri Enter., 878 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Ark. Ct. App. 1994).
161 U.T. AGRIC. EXTENSION SERV., PUB. No. SP701B-5M-3/08(REP) R12-4110-070-012-08
08-0166, USING SWITCHGRASS FOR FORAGE (2008) available at
https://utextension.tennessee.edu/publications/Documents/SP701 -B.pdf.
162 id
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ethanol producer within 20 days before the producer's bankruptcy was filed
when the goods have been sold to the producer in the ordinary course of the
producer's business.163 In a bankruptcy case, an administrative expense is
given priority over unsecured debts owed by the ethanol producer.'6 This
means the farmer, if the bankruptcy court decides that he meets the
requirements for an administrative expense, will be paid after secured
creditors but before the unsecured creditors.' 65
No bankruptcy court has yet ruled that supplying biomass qualifies
as an administrative expense, but it is a plausible claim. In order to bring a
claim for an administrative expense, the farmer will need to establish that:
(1) the vendor sold "goods" to the debtor; (2) the goods were received by
the debtor within twenty days prior to filing; and (3) the goods were sold to
the debtor in the ordinary course of business.'66 The Bankruptcy Code does
not define a "good," but courts faced with this issue have turned to the
UCC's § 2-105 definition of a "good."167 As previously discussed, the UCC
includes growing crops in the definition of "goods."' 6 8 Although courts
have not yet applied it to them, dedicated energy crops should be included
in this definition of "goods." 69 Another unresolved issue is whether the
crop residue used to produce cellulosic ethanol, such as rice straw or wheat
straw, is included in "growing crops."170 These issues need to be resolved
by the courts before a farmer could be certain that his biomass qualifies as a
"good" and will meet the requirements of an administrative expense.
Next, the farmer will need to establish that the ethanol producer
received goods within twenty days prior to the bankruptcy filing. The
twenty-day time period exists to prevent the ethanol producer from
acquiring goods during a period when he knows that bankruptcy filing is
imminent. 17' The farmer could establish this requirement by presenting
records of the deliveries that took place within twenty days of the
bankruptcy filing.
Finally, the farmer must establish that the biomass was sold in the
"ordinary course of business." The Bankruptcy Code does not define this
term and courts have yet to consider its meaning. Black's Legal Dictionary
defines the "ordinary course of business" as "normal routine in managing a
trade or business."1 72 A farmer selling biomass to an ethanol producer will
163 1 U.S.C.A. § 503(b)(9) (West 2011).
16 See Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2000).
165 id.
" In re Goody's Family Clothing Inc., 401 B.R. 131, 133 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009).
161 Id. at 134.
' See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
' Id.
70 id.
171 See Lauren C. Cohen, The Application of Section 502(d) to Section 503(b)(9) Claims -
"You Can Put Lipstick on a Pig, " 18 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 2 (2009).
172 BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 378 (8th ed. 2004).
92
THE NEW FUEL FRONTIER
generally meet this requirement because the selling of commodities is part
of a normal farm management routine. Any farmer that believes they meet
the three requirements, and is dealing with an ethanol producer in
bankruptcy, should put forward an administrative expense claim.
2. Protections for Bankrupt Ethanol Producer
(a) Executory Contracts
There are several issues that a farmer should keep in mind in the
event that the ethanol producer files for bankruptcy. When in bankruptcy,
the ethanol producer will have the opportunity to accept or reject certain
contracts. 17 3 This means the ethanol producer could decide to accept or
reject the farmer's biomass production contract. This power to accept or
reject contracts is limited to contracts classified as "executory contracts."l74
An "executory contract" is "[a] contract that remains wholly unperformed
or for which there remains something still to be done on both sides."s The
ethanol producer would have until the confirmation of the bankruptcy plan
to decide which executory contracts to accept or reject. 176 A bankruptcy
plan can take time to develop, and farmers may not want to sit in limbo
waiting for the bankruptcy plan to be confirmed. To protect the farmer or
any other person that has contracted with someone in bankruptcy, the
Bankruptcy Code allows for any party with an "executory contract" to
request that the bankruptcy court set a specified period of time for the
ethanol producer to reject or accept his biomass production contract.177
For a contract to be an "executory contract" in bankruptcy, there
must be some performance due from both parties.'78 In an example biomass
production contract, the farmer would still owe future deliveries of biomass
and the ethanol producer would owe payments for those future deliveries. If
the only remaining performance is payment of money, or there is no
continuing obligation, the contract is not considered an "executory
contract."l 7 9 In previous corn ethanol producers' bankruptcies, corn growers
who contracted with the bankrupt ethanol plants were warned that the
ethanol producer would have the right to accept or reject their corn
' 11 U.S.C.A. § 365 (West 2011).
11 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(a) (West 2011).
'7 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 344 (8th ed. 2004).
116 1 U.S.C.A. § 365(d)(2) (West 2011).
78 See 31 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 78:38 (4th ed. 2012).
1
79
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contracts.s 0 A biomass production contract may be similar enough to these
corn producers' contracts that it will be held to be an executory contract by
a bankruptcy court.
If contracts are rejected, it will be considered a breach of contract
that will relate back to the day before the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. 181 The breach claim can be any breach of contract claim for
damages that the relevant state law allows.18 2 Any claim for damages by the
farmer for breach of the rejected biomass production contract would be a
pre-bankruptcy unsecured claim." As a result of the fact that the claim for
damages would be unsecured, the farmer will not get his whole value of
damages owed to him because he would be among the last in line to get
paid from the ethanol producer.
(b) Preferential Payments
Farmers should also consider the danger of being classified a
preferential payment. Consider for a moment that Ethanol A has recently
filed for bankruptcy, but Farmer B has made no recent deliveries, and
Ethanol A has paid Farmer B for all deliveries to date. Farmer B might
think that the bankruptcy does not affect him, but Ethanol A may try to
recover money already paid to him.
The Bankruptcy Code allows the ethanol producer to avoid certain
payments made to creditors.184 Section 547 allows the ethanol producer to
avoid, or "render void,"' 85 any payment made to a creditor such as a farmer
with a biomass production contract that was made while the ethanol
producer was insolvent or within the 90-day period before the bankruptcy
petition was filed.' 86 If Ethanol A has paid Farmer B for past deliveries
within 90 days of the bankruptcy petition being filed, or while Ethanol A
was insolvent, then any payments made to Farmer B could be voided. When
payment is voided, Farmer B would be required to pay back any money
received during that period.
The reasons to allow avoidance is to prevent the ethanol producer
from choosing his preferred creditors, paying the full debt owed to the
180 See Roger McEowen, VeraSun Energy Bankruptcy Poses Perils for Farmers and
Elevators, IOWA ST. U. CENTER FOR AGRIC. L. & TAX'N (Nov. 18, 2008),
http://www.calt.iastate.edu/verasun.html.
' 9C AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 2374 (2011).
182 Roger McEowen, The Assumption or Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy -
Are Commodity Contracts Within a Safe Harbor?, IOWA ST. U. CENTER FOR AGRIC. L. & TAX'N
(Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.calt.iastate.edu/briefs/CALTLegalBrief-Executory/ 20Contracts%20
in%20Bankruptcy.pdf.
183 id.
'8 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b) (West 2011).
185 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 146 (8b ed. 2004).
..6 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b) (West 2011).
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preferred creditors, and not paying other creditors during a time period
when he knew he might file for bankruptcy.'17 The bankruptcy trustee or
creditor's committee will need to establish six elements to prove that the
payment was a preference: (1) that the ethanol producer made a payment, or
any transfer of the ethanol producer's property, to the farmer; (2) the
transfer was because of a preexisting debt; (3) the transfer was to or for the
benefit of the farmer; (4) the transfer was made while the ethanol producer
was insolvent; (5) the transfer was within 90 days of the ethanol producer
filing for bankruptcy; and (6) the transfer left the farmer in a better position
than if the farmer had asserted a claim for the same debt in a Chapter 7
bankruptcy proceeding. 8 8
Additionally, the Bankruptcy Code allows one to defend against a
claim of a preference payment.18 9 The farmer has the burden to prove each
defense.' 90 The most likely defense to be applicable is that payment was
received in the ordinary course of business.'91 This defense allows a farmer
to keep any payment made by the ethanol producer when the payment is
"made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the [ethanol
producer.]" 92 To show the payment was made in the ordinary course of
business, the farmer must present all receipts for biomass delivered or
picked up, slips for deposit of checks from the ethanol producer, or any
records that establish delivery and payment history by the ethanol
producer. 193 For normal payments made to the farmer for delivery of
biomass, the ordinary course of business defense would be the best defense
against a claim of preference payment.
If the farmer receives a letter demanding return of payments made
to the farmer on the grounds that the payments are preferential, the farmer
should immediately contact an attorney. The attorney can help the farmer
determine if the farmer qualifies for this defense or any other possible
defenses to a claim of preference payment. In one ethanol bankruptcy,
VeraSun sent letters to farmers seeking repayment of any payments for corn
deliveries made 90 days before the ethanol producer filed bankruptcy.194
The letters stated that if the farmer acted quickly, they would only have to
repay 80% of the payments made 90 days before the bankruptcy was
'8 See Roger A. McEowen, The Agriprocessors Bankruptcy - Can The Bankruptcy Trustee
Recover Payments Made to Suppliers Within 90 Days of the Bankruptcy Filing?, IOWA ST. U. CENTER
FOR AGRIC. L. & TAX'N (Dec. 3, 2009), http://www.calt.iastate.edu/briefs/CALT%/20
Legal%20Brief/o20-%20Agriprocessors%20Bankruptcy.pdf [hereinafter Agriprocessors Bankruptcy].
188 See id
1' See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c) (West 2011).
190 See McEowen, supra note 187.
'9' See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(2) (West 2011).
192 id.
193 See McEowen, supra note 187.
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filed.195 The farmers were also warned that they would have to respond to
the letter promptly. 196 The farmers' attorneys responded to VeraSun's
letters, and the claims against the farmers were ultimately dropped before
the farmers paid the money. 1 If our hypothetical farmer got a similar
letter from a cellulosic ethanol producer, the farmer should not return any
payments made within 90 days of the bankruptcy being filed. Instead, the
farmer should meet with an attorney to determine what defenses are
available to the ethanol producer's demands.
III. CONCLUSION
This article presented a framework for drafting and evaluating
biomass production contracts. General contract law has been applied to the
specific context of cellulosic ethanol production. Possible provisions of a
biomass production contract have been discussed. Finally, the consequences
of an ethanol producer's potential insolvency and bankruptcy have been
explored.
Despite recent dramatic cuts in the 2012 cellulosic ethanol
production mandates, the United States is dedicated to making the
cellulosic ethanol industry a viable alternative to corn-based ethanol. 198
New incentives to encourage cellulosic ethanol production are still being
added. The United States Army recently issued a seven billion dollar
solicitation to encourage the development of renewable energy facilities
near Department of Defense facilities and biomass processing facilities are
specifically mentioned.'99 As biomass crops become a viable alternative
commodity and the industry grows, farmers will be presented with new
opportunities to diversify their operations, and attorneys will have an
opportunity to shape the contracts of this new industry.
195 ld
196 See Todd Neeley, What Should Farmers Do About VeraSun Letters?, PROGRESSIVE
FARMER'S ETHANOL BLOG (Sept. 2, 2010, 10:41 AM),
http://www.dtnprogressivefanner.com/ag/blogs/templatel&blogHandle=ethanol&blogEntryld=8a82cOb
c2a8c8730012ad303c5b6037f.
' See Holly Jessen, VeraSun Drops Demands Made to Corn Farmers, ETHANOL PRODUCER
MAG. (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.ethanolproducer.com/articles/7050/verasun-drops-demands-made-to-
corn-farmers.
98 See Doggett & Rascoe, supra note 6.
199 Foley & Lardner LLP, Army Issues Multi-Billion-Dollar Solicitation for Large-Scale
Renewable and Alternative Energy Production for Federal Installations, JDSUPRA (Aug. 22 2012),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/army-issues-multi-billion-dollar-solicit-l 1300/.
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